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SINE QUA NON: TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT,
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION, AND THE
BUSINESS OF COLLEGIATE LICENSING
I. INTRODUCTION

Growing up, I thought that college football was the greatest game on earth.
I based my reasoning primarily on the fact that college athletes played for the love
of the game, not the motivation of a weekly paycheck. I now realize, however,
that my earlier perspective was naive; what I have seen on television and read in
the daily sports section has taught me otherwise. Though I still consider college
football to be the world's greatest sport, the truth is that money makes the world
go 'round, and college athletics are not immune from this reality. In fact, in the
world of college sports, money plays an especially important role. Take football
as an example. A romantic purist often fails to consider the incredible costs
associated with fielding a top-notch team. Upon careful examination, however,
even the most idealistic fan cannot ignore the tremendous sums expended
annually for luxuries-nowadays necessities-such as travel expenses, facility
improvements, coaches' salaries, and of course, the scholarships which permit
outstanding athletes to perform for the nation's entertainment. How do
institutions of higher learning afford these costs? Ticket sales, concession
proceeds, booster donations, and television revenues are the obvious answers.
One of the largest and most often-overlooked sources of revenue available to
these institutions, however, is the sale of officially licensed collegiate merchandise.
For many years, the sale of collegiate products was an untapped gold mine;
colleges and universities have only recently begun to realize the extensive financial
benefits of licensing programs.' The increased popularity of collegiate merchandise resulted from the advent of televised college sports during the 1970s and its
growth in that medium during the 1980s.2 Indeed, the ubiquity of collegiate

' Robert Lattinville, Logo Cops: The Law and Budness of ColftiateiJcnn, 5 KAN. J.L & PUB.
POL'Y 81, 81 n.4 (1996) (citing Harvard University's application for a trademark of its name 355
years after its founding as evidence of the "recency of universities' awakening to the benefits of
licensing"); see alro Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Profl Therapy Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1280,
1283-84, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1242 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (noting that local merchants were
responsible for most of the unauthorized use of college marks prior to the 1970s, but that during
the 1980s many institutions began instituting licensing programs to protect their marks).
2 Id
at 81 (noting that by the mid-1980s, increased television coverage of college sports
motivated many colleges and universities to establish licensing programs in order to exercise control
over their marks); see also Bd of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 873 F. Supp. at 1284 (stating that television
coverage of collegiate sporting events "led to an enormous boom in the production and sale of
goods bearing collegiate marks").
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merchandise in modem American culture evidences the popularity of college
athletics. For example, many people affix collegiate license plates, spare tire
covers, and bumper stickers to their automobiles or hang flags from their front
porches announcing their allegiance to a particular school. Nowadays, more and
more schools are turning to these programs as a valuable source of revenue.
Professional sports leagues began to establish profitable licensing programs years
ago, and colleges have followed their lead, surpassing most of their professional
counterparts in licensing revenue in recent years. In 1995, sales of collegiate
licensed merchandise exceeded $2.5 billion, eclipsing the revenues of every major
professional sports league except the NFL.' In 1999, that figure climbed to $2.7
billion.4
Despite the tremendous revenue that licensed collegiate merchandise provides,
it nevertheless engenders problems. The focus of the aforementioned statistics
was the sale of licensed merchandise, but there is also a market for the sale of
unlicensedcollegiate products. Every sale of these unlicensed products deprives the
licensing college or university of revenue because colleges and universities own
valuable assets in their trademarked names, logos, and other materials.'
Imagine that you are tailgating one Saturday morning before your school's big
game. A merchant approaches and asks if you are interested in purchasing that
week's "game shirt" featuring your school's official logo on the front and a
picture of your mascot trampling, swatting, beating, or otherwise harassing your
opponent's mascot on the back. Is that product licensed by your school? Does
it matter? And perhaps most importantly, should it matter?
This Note explores the legal implications of collegiate licensing. Part II
examines trademark law as it applies to college and university names, logos, and
symbols and considers the applicable case law that forms the history of collegiate
trademark protection. Part III provides a brief discussion of the business of
collegiate licensing and the enforcement of trademark rights. Part IV discusses
the decisive issue of "likelihood of confusion" in two different lines of cases.
Moreover, it argues that in many situations where obvious violations of trademark
rights appear to have occurred, the essential element of "likelihood of confusion"
is actually lacking, and thus, colleges and universities have no remedy against the
unlicensed users of their marks. Finally, Part V addresses the reasons why, in
many cases, it should not matter that a particular item bearing a collegiate
Michael Hiestand, College MerchandiseSaks Near Head of Class,USA TODAY, July 25, 1995, at
3C.

' Robin Hardin & Steven McClung, Collegiate Sports Information: A Profile of the Profession, PUB.
REL. Q., July 1, 2002, at 35.
See, e.g., Danielle Cooper, UT Cracks Down on IllegalMerhandise,DAILY TEXAN (Austin), Sept.

9, 1998 (stating that the University of Texas does not receive any compensation from unlicensed
vendors).
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trademark is licensed and also suggests that the United States Supreme Court
grant certiorari in a future case to resolve the incongruities between the two
divergent lines of cases identified in Part IV.
II. BACKGROUND 6
A. TRADEMARKS AND THE LANHAM ACT

Federal trademark law affords protection to officially licensed collegiate
merchandise.7 The Lanham Act is the primary legislative device governing
trademark law.' The Act sets forth the law of trademarks, establishes the criteria
for their registration, and provides remedies for infringement.9
Three types of marks are particularly pertinent to the collegiate licensing
industry: trademarks, service marks, and collective marks.10 Under the Act, a
trademark includes "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof" used by a person, merchant, or manufacturer "to identify and distinguish
his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods. .

. .""

Examples of collegiate trademarks include

"University of Colorado," "Ole Miss Rebels," and "Nittany Lions." A service
mark, in contrast, is a mark, symbol, or word used to differentiate the services of
one entity from another and to identify the source of such services." Because
colleges and universities also market services, the protection of service marks is
equally important when considering the breadth of collegiate licensing. "Final
Four" and "University of Virginia Lacrosse" are representative service marks.
Trademarks and service marks employed by members of an organization
constitute collective marks;" "Big Ten" and "Southeastern Conference" are
examples. Finally, some marks qualify as both trademarks and service marks,
depending on the context of their use. "Auburn Tiger Football" is a trademark
when printed on a stadium cup but constitutes a service mark when used to
promote an athletic event. For the purpose of this Note, the terms "trademark"
or "mark" will refer to all three types of marks unless otherwise specified.

6

SeegeneraI4 Lattinville, upra note 1 (much of the author's structural format for discussing

background information has been adopted from Lattinville's article).
7 See U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (providing the constitutional basis for federal trademark law).
8 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1051-1129 (2000).

9 Id
10 Lattinville, supranote 1, at 82.
i 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
12 Id
13 Id4

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

3

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 8

J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 11:421

Trademarks perform four primary functions. 4 First, a trademark differentiates one mark from another by virtue of its distinctiveness."5 Second, a trademark
establishes the universal quality of all goods and services bearing the mark. 6
Third, a trademark confirms that all goods and services bearing the mark derive
from the same source." Finally, a trademark serves as a marketing tool to assist
in the sale of goods and services bearing that mark."8
A person seeking to register a trademark must file an application with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office and pay the applicable fees.' 9 The cost to register
a trademark, ranging from approximately $1,000 to $1,500 for a trademark search
and most fees, is minimal when compared to the potential revenue from licensing
such marks. 20 A party's registration of a trademark is prima facie evidence of the
21
mark's validity and the registrant's exclusive right to use that mark in commerce.
B. STRENGTH AND DISTINCTIVENESS

Trademarks receive protection based on a number of criteria, and varying
levels of protection are afforded to marks depending on their strength. Simply
put, stronger marks receive greater protection than weaker marks.22 Courts
determine the strength of a trademark primarily by assessing the mark's
distinctiveness. In turn, courts ascertain distinctiveness by focusing on a mark's
"capacity to distinguish a product or service which originates from one source
from products or services originating from other sources."' Some marks are
inherently distinctive and qualify for immediate protection while others first
require proof of secondary meaning. 24 In order for a trademark to acquire

14 Lattinville, supra note 1, at 82.
Is Id

16 Id

s Id
19 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).
'0 Lattinville, sapranote 1, at 82.
21 15

U.S.C. § 1115 (2000).

" See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Prof'l Therapy Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1280, 1285, 34

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241,1243 (stating that "[a] strongand distinctive trademark is entitled to greater
protection than a weak or commonplace one" (quoting Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086,
1091 (8th Cir. 1980)).
z Lattinville, .*pra note 1, at 83.
24 See Celeste L. Geier, Comment, Protectionof UniversiiSymbr, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 661,668-69
(1986) (stating that "[flanciful or arbitrary marks and suggestive marks are considered inherently

unique or distinctive").
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distinctiveness, it must first serve as an indicator of source and not be merely
decorative or functional."
Courts have identified five categories of marks, depending on their distinctiveness: arbitrary or fanciful marks, suggestive marks, descriptive marks, and generic
marks. 26 An arbitrary mark consists of words or symbols that suggest nothing
about the product to which they refer.2" Closely related are fanciful marks, which
are comprised of words "invented or selected for the sole purpose of functioning
as a trademark" and which are either "unknown in the language or are completely
out of common usage... .,,21 "NIKE" and the NIKE "swoosh" are examples
of arbitrary or fanciful marks because neither the name nor the symbol provides
any information about Nike's products. Suggestive marks convey the nature of
the product "through an effort of the imagination on the part of the observer."'
For example, the name of Ford Motor Company's "Taurus" model is suggestive
because it prompts the consumer to form a mental connection between the
product's name and its purpose. Individuals and companies may register both
arbitrary and suggestive marks under the Act.'
A trademark which simply
describes the function, size, provider, user, or characteristics of the good to which
it refers is a descriptive mark.3 "Sportscreme" is a prime example of a descriptive
mark. 2 Finally, generic marks are words and symbols which identify an entire
class of products without distinguishing one product from another. These marks
simply state exactly what the product is.33 Examples of generic marks are
abundant and include terms such as "diet soda," "iced tea," and "wheat bran."
The Act disallows registration of generic marks.'
Again, some trademarks require proof of secondary meaning to acquire
distinctive status. Generally, arbitrary and fanciful marks are distinctive by their

2s Lattinville, supra note 1, at 83.

Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1540, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122,1126

(11th Cir. 1985).

27 2J.THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHYONTRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:11,

at 16 (4th ed. 2003).
2 Id 11:5, at 12.
Id § 11:64, at 126 (quoting Gen. Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95,45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196
(4th Cir. 1940), rwbg denied, 112 F.2d 561, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 590 (4th Cit. 1940)).
-1 Segeneral 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).

2 MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 11:16, at 21-22.
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208,216, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124,131 (2d Cit.
1985) (stating that the term "Sportscreme" is not suggestive but instead descriptive because "[n]o
exercise of the imagination is necessary for the public to understand that the product is a cream
useful in connection with sports. Marks that describe the use to which a product is put are
descriptive.").
33 See general§ 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 12.1, at 4-7.
3,
32

- 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
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nature, while descriptive marks require proof of secondary meaning.3" Assessing
secondary meaning requires consideration of the buyer's perceived connection or
association between the product, the mark, and its source.36 The NatioxalFootball
League Properties,Inc. v.Wichita FallsSportswear,Inc.37 opinion bears this out. There,

the plaintiffs (NFLP and the Seattle Seahawks) brought suit against a sportswear
manufacturer to enjoin the defendant from producing replica jerseys of NFL
teams. The court found that, because the jerseys were decorated with descriptive
terms, such as the name of the team or its home city, proof of secondary meaning
was required before protection would be granted."8 Primarily through the use of
survey data, NFLP was able to satisfy the test for secondary meaning by showing
that a substantial percentage of those surveyed associated the jerseys with the
39
NFL.

In contrast, the court in University of Pittsburghv. Champion Products, Inc. found
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the "Pitt insignia had acquired
secondary meaning in the soft goods (e.g., t-shirts, sweatshirts, caps) market.'
Applying a test identical to that employed in Wichita Falls, the court found that
Pitt had failed to show "a substantial association in the public's mind between the
use of Pitt insignia on soft goods and a sense that Pitt was in some way affiliated
with the source of the products. '
In order to qualify for protection under federal trademark law, a mark may not
be merely functional.42 Functionality is that feature of a good which constitutes
the benefit that consumers seek.' Functional goods include not only the item
itself (e.g., a baseball cap) but often the aesthetically pleasing elements of the

- See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Prof'i Therapy Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1280, 1285-86, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1244 (stating that "[a] general rule is that arbitrary marks are inherently
distinctive and strong, while descriptive marks are not due any protection at all, unless the mark
owner can prove that the mark has acquired secondary meaning").
. Stephen N. Geise, A Wohok New Ballgame: The Appif'ation of Trademark Law to Sports Mark
Liigation,5 SETON HALLJ. SPORTL. 553, 559 (1995).

532 F. Supp. 651,215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
SSee general# id at 656-57.
3 Id at 658.
566 F. Supp. 711, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 834 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
41Id at 721. Despite the remarkable factual similarities between Wichita Falls and University of
Pittsburgh,the courts reached opposite conclusions. The discrepancies between these two cases, as
well as inconsistencies in other decisions, will form the basis of the argument presented in Part IV.
42 Geier, smpra note 24, at 672.
4 Wichita Falls, 532 F. Supp. at 662 (describing the functional features as those benefits the
consumer wishes to purchase, "as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made,
also Univ. of Pittsbkrlh, 566 F. Supp. at 720 (citing Inwood
sponsored, or endorsed a product"); see
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, at 851 n.10 (wherein the Supreme Court defined
functionality as "essential to the use or purpose of the article" or affecting "the cost or quality of the
article')).
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/8
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product (e.g., the design embroidered on the cap's fabric). Trademark law does
not prevent the replication of the functional features of a product," and thes
plaintiff in an infringement suit bears the burden of proving nonfunctionality.
Even if a mark is found to be functional, protection is not automatically
precluded.' A functional product may also obtain secondary meaning if the
customer purchased the item not only for its functional characteristics but also
because she believed that the trademark indicated an association between the
product and the mark's owner.47
When a college or university registers a valid trademark, it normally does so
in connection with its provision of educational services." When used in a manner
unrelated to educational services, the purpose of the mark gains significance and
whether the mark is functional or serves as an indicator of source becomes
important.49 For example, the depiction of a school's mascot is not related to the
provision of educational services. Thus, one must determine whether the mascot
image indicates a source of origin or merely serves as an aesthetically pleasing
feature.
C. CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE LANHAM ACT

The Lanham Act provides two primary causes of action for the violation of
a trademark owner's rights: an action for unfair competition' and an action for
the infringement of a registered mark."1 The success of either type of claim
requires proof of many of the same elements.
Chapter 15, section 1125, of the United States Code establishes a cause of
action for unfair competition. One primary difference exists between section
1125 and section 1114, the code section which provides remedies for trademark
infringement; the former offers protection for unregistered trademarks while the
latter does not. 2 Under section 1125, an unfair competition cause of action may

" Wichita Fah,532 F. Supp. at 662; see also Univ. of Pitsbxrgh, 566 F. Supp. at 720 (stating that
a product's functional features receive no protection under the Lanham Act).
45 Univ. of Pittsigh,566 F. Supp. at 720.
"WichitaFal,
532 F. Supp. at 663.
Id (citing Intl Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 208 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 718 (9th Cir. 1980)).
" Lattinville, supra note 1, at 84.
49id

-o15 U.s.c. S1125 (2000).

51Id § 1114.
52 15

U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services... uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
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involve claims of false designation of origin, false advertising, or disparagement. s3
In University of Pittsburgh, the court declared that a plaintiff must prove four
elements in a suit for unfair competition: (1) nonfunctionality, (2) secondary
meaning, (3) prior use, and (4) likelihood of confusion. s4 The elements of
functionality and secondary meaning apply as discussed above. In discussing the
third element, priority of use, the court in University of Pittsburghrequired Pitt to
prove not only its prior use of the insignia but also its prior use in commerce.
Following the guidance of the Restatement of Torts,"5 the court found, as a
matter of fact, that Pitt was not using its insignia in commerce prior to Champion's entrance into the market.5 6 The fourth element of an action for unfair
competition is likelihood of confusion on the part of the consumer. Because
likelihood of confusion is a crucial element not only in unfair competition cases
but also in trademark infringement cases-indeed, it is "the keystone to any
trademark infringement action"S-this Note will discuss it below in connection
with that action.
Under chapter 15, section 1114, the owner of a registered trademark has a
cause of action against any person who uses a reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of the mark in commerce where such use is likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deception." Again, unlike section 1125, section 1114
applies only to the misappropriation of registered trademarks. Thus, in every
successful action for trademark infringement, two questions must be answered in

or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or

association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

Id§a1125(a)(1).

Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 719, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

(W.D. Pa. 1983).
5- RESTATEMENT OFTORTs § 719 (1938). Section 719 provides: "A designation is not a trademark until it is adopted for the purpose of denominating the goods to which it is affixed andis so used

in marketing them." (emphasis added).

s Univ. of Piarburgh,566 F. Supp. at 722.
5' Natl Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportwear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651,659,215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175, 182 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
58

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). The statute provides in relevant part
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or inconnection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. .. shall be liable in a
civil action by the registrant ....

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/8
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the affirmative: (1) is there a valid mark, and if so, (2) is the defendant's use of
the mark likely to cause consumer confusion? 9 Formal registration of a
trademark under the Act serves as prima facie evidence of the validity of the
mark,' and thus, the answer to the first question is, in most cases, easily
ascertained. The crux of an action for trademark infringement, as well as for an
action for unfair competition as discussed above, therefore rests on the answer
to the second question. Simply put, likelihood of confusion is the sine qua non
of the action.6 1
The test for likelihood of confusion varies by jurisdiction, but the various
approaches are similar enough that a discussion of one case should suffice for
demonstrative purposes. In Boardof Trustees of the University ofArk. v. Professional
Therapy Services, Inc., 2 (the "Razorback case") the court used a six-factor test to
determine whether the therapy clinic's unauthorized use of the University's
Razorback nickname and logo constituted trademark infringement. Specifically,
in finding that the clinic's actions did infringe the University's registered mark, the
court considered (1) the strength of the owner's mark, (2) the similarity between
the owner's mark and the alleged infringer's mark, (3) the degree to which the
products are in competition with one another (i.e., the "competitive proximity"
of the products), (4) the intent of the alleged infringer to portray the owner of the
mark as the source of the goods, (5) the incidents of actual confusion, and (6) the
63
degree of care likely to be exercised by potential customers.
The court considered each of these factors in turn, and an analysis of the
court's findings with respect to each is helpful not only in understanding the
decision in that case but also in evaluating other cases under a similar test. In the
Razorback case, the court assessed the strength of the University's mark by
examining its distinctiveness, as discussed above,6 and found that the Razorback
marks were strong and worthy of protection. 5 The court next analyzed the
similarity between the University's mark and that of the clinic. The court found
that the marks were identical and that this similarity was enhanced by the clinic's
use of the color red, the university's color, and by a running Razorback hog
logo.' The court also determined that the relatedness of the type of services

5' Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Prof'l Therapy Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1280, 1285, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1243 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
60 15

U.S.C. S 1115 (2000).

61 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711,719,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

834,841 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
62 873

F. Supp. 1280.

Id at 1285.
6See
rupra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
6

65 873
6

F. Supp. at 1285.

Id at 1290-91. In 1989, the clinic changed its name from the Physical Therapy Clinic to
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for the University in light of the
provided by the parties favored a finding
67
competitive proximity of the services.
Though the record was inconclusive on the clinic's intent to deceive, evidence
that the clinic changed its name after two University football trainers joined the
clinic's staff and the clinic's emphasis on its relationship with the University over
a number of years suggests that a deceptive intent was present." Regarding actual
confusion, the court noted that neither party had offered probative evidence on
this factor but stated that "actual confusion is strong evidence of a likelihood of
'
Finally, in discussing the degree of care used by consumers, the
confusion."69
court noted that while doctors prescribing the clinic's services might not be
confused as to the true source of the services, the patients consuming the services
exercise a lower degree of care.7' The court then stated that factors such as the
kind of product, its cost, and the conditions of purchase are determinative in
deciding whether consumers exercise a high degree of care. The court also noted,
however, that the exercise of a high degree of care on the part of consumers is
less probative when the other factors favor a finding of infringement.7
Courts have used variations of this test elsewhere. For example, in University
of GeorgiaAthleticAssociationv.Laite, the court employed a similar test considering
seven factors and focusing on marketing channels. 7' Likewise, in Universiy of
Pittrburgh,while the court did not utilize a formal test, it considered many of the
the strength of the mark, intent to
same factors as other jurisdictions, including
74
deceive, and incidents of actual confusion.

Razorback Sports and Physical Therapy Clinic. The University has used the name "Razorbacks" as
a nickname for its sports teams since 1909.
11Id at 1290.
68 Id at 1284-85.
69 Id

10Bd of Tr. of Univ. ofArk., 873 F. Supp. at 1292.
71Id

1 756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122 (11th Cir. 1985).
"3Id at 1542 (stating that "this circuit has recognized seven factors as relevant to the
determination of a 'likelihood of confusion' between two trade or service marks: (1) the type of
mark at issue, (2) the similarity of design between the two marks, (3) the similarity of the product,
(4) the identity of retail outlets and purchasers, (5) the identity of advertising media utilized, (6) the
defendant's intent, and (7) actual confusion between the two marks").
' See general# Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 834 (W.D. Pa. 1983). It should be noted, however, that although the court in Universify of
Pittsbuwgb found that the University faied to meet its burden, the court's decision was vacated after
the parties reached a settlement agreement, and the case is of no precedential value. Lattinville, sufpra
note 1, at 86-87.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/8

10

Withers: Sine Qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confusion, an

COLLEGIATE LICENSING

2004]
D. DEFENSES

A defendant might assert several affirmative defenses in order to defeat an

action for unfair competition or trademark infringement. Three notable examples
are abandonment, the "zone of expansion" defense, and the functionality defense.
This subsection considers the viability of each of these defenses in turn.
The Lanham Act itself provides for a defense of abandonment." Specifically,
nonuse coupled with an intent not to resume use indicates abandonment. 6 The
Act requires that "use" be evidenced by good faith and be "made in the ordinary
course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a mark."" Further, with
regard to use, a defendant may point to nonuse for three consecutive years as
prima facie evidence of abandonment."8 Finally, it should also be noted that,
despite the good faith use of a trademark, the Act states that abandonment may
occur when the owner causes the mark to become generic.7 In other words, a
mark is abandoned when it loses its significance as an indicator of origin.'s
The defense of abandonment may be difficult to prove because the proponent
of abandonment bears a formidable burden. In Board of Regents of the University
System of Georia v. Buzas Baseball, Inc.,"1 the Georgia Institute of Technology
("Georgia Tech' sued a minor league baseball team for trademark infringement
because the Utah team sold merchandise bearing the name "Buzz" and a specific
bee logo, both of which were registered trademarks of Georgia Tech. Buzas
Baseball raised a number of defenses, including a claim that Georgia Tech had
abandoned its trademark rights. Specifically, the defendant contended that
Georgia Tech had abandoned its marks by failing to enforce its rights against
three Georgia high schools using the marks.' The court determined, however,
that the high schools were not infringers but rather third-party users which

75 15
76 Id

U.S.C. S 1127 (2000).

7 id

Id

Id

The statute provides in relevant part.
A mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned' if... (2) When any course of conduct
of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark
to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with
which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser
motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this
paragraph.
o Lattinville, supra note 1, at 86.

81176 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
82 Id at 1349.
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Georgia Tech had tolerated or of which the school was unaware.8 3 Furthermore,
even if the high schools had been infringers, a failure on the part of Georgia Tech
to institute legal proceedings would have been insufficient to constitute
abandonment." Most importantly, however, in granting Georgia Tech's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of abandonment, the court in Butas Baseball
stated that "[t]he defense of abandonment requires strict proof," as the defendant
must prove both that the plaintiff actually abandoned the use of the mark and the
plaintiff intended this abandonment. 5
Despite this, in some cases the defendant's burden in asserting abandonment
is less than it may seem. In certain situations, courts place a burden on the
plaintiff to prove intent not to abandon rather than placing a burden on the
defendant to prove intent to abandon. In MajorLeague BaseballProperties,Inc. v. Sed
Non Olet Denarius, Ld," the plaintiffs, Major League Baseball Properties and the
Los Angeles Dodgers baseball team, sued a restaurant group in Brooklyn, New
York, for its use of the name "The Brooklyn Dodger" for its restaurants. The
court found that the plaintiffs had abandoned the trademark "Brooklyn Dodgers"
because, among other reasons, the plaintiffs had failed to use the trademark in
commerce for over twenty years.8 7 The plaintiffs' lack of use easily met the
Lanham Act's prima facie threshold for abandonment by nonuse (which was only
two years at the time). The court noted that such a prima fade establishment of
abandonment creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment.8 8 In order to
rebut this presumption, the plaintiffs had to produce evidence that there was
intent to resume the use of the trademark.89 Thus, the burden shifted; since the
defendant met its burden by providing prima facie evidence of intent to abandon,
the plaintiff, rather than proving that it did not intend to abandon its mark, had
to prove that it intended to resume use of the mark.9" The court noted that "mlack
of intent to resume use may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
nonuse of the mark."9 1 Because the plaintiffs had not evinced intent to resume

83 id

" Id ("[F]alilure to institute legal action against an infringer is insufficient to establish
abandonment of a trademark." (quoting Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1180
(11th Cir. 1994))).
8 Id
6

817 F. Supp. 1103,26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1731 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
at 1134.
at 1127.

87 Id
8 Id

'9 Id at 1130.
9 Id
'" Mijor League Baseball, 817 F. Supp. at 1130.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/8

12

Withers: Sine Qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confusion, an

COLLEGL4TE LICENSING

2004]

commercial use of the mark within the statutory period, the court held that the
mark had been abandoned.92
The "zone of expansion" defense considers the scope of the plaintiff's
trademark as it relates to the defendant's use of the mark.93 This defense
essentially provides that if the registered owner of a mark and an unauthorized
user of a mark operate in two "sufficiently distinct and geographically separate"
markets and if there is no likelihood that the registered owner will enter into the
unauthorized user's market (thus eliminating a likelihood of confusion), the
registered owner may not enjoin the other's use.94 In MajorLeague Baseball, the
court recognized the validity of the "zone of expansion" defense where the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated an interest or intent to enter the restaurant
business in Brooklyn.9"
Finally, it should be noted that while functionality may prevent a mark from
qualifying for protection under the Lanham Act, as discussed above, functionality
may also serve as an affirmative defense. For example, in Wichita Falls, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff's mark was functional and therefore not
entitled to protection. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court noted that
even functional features may serve as trademarks.96 In contrast, the University of
Pittsburghcourt found that Champion's use of the Pitt insignia on soft goods did
qualify as functional use.97
E. THE RECENT TREND

Despite decisions such as the one in University of Pittsburgh, the recent trend
seems to favor the protection of colleges' and universities' marks. It is of note
98
that the court's decision in University ofPittsburghis of no precedential value, and
a substantial number of cases since have been decided in favor of trademark
owners.' As will be discussed in Part IV, however, depending on the uses made

9 817 F. Supp. at 1131.
13

Lattinville, supra note 1, at 86.

817 F. Supp. at 1133.
9' Id at 1134. It is interesting to note, however, that the court recognized the "zone of
expansion" defense in this case despite the fact that the court held that the plaintiffs had effectively
abandoned the "Brooklyn Dodgers" trademark. Why would the court seek to provide protection
for an unauthorized user in a case in which the court had determined that the defendant was not,
in fact, an unauthorized user?
' Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175, 184 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
97 566 F. Supp. 711,720,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 834, 838 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
9

98 See supranote 74.

9 See, e.g., Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122 (11 th
Cir. 1985); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Prof'l Therapy Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1280, 34
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by non-registrants, it is conceivable, and hopeful, that courts will hold as the court
did in Universioy ofPittrburghand allow the unlicensed use of college and university
marks when such use does not create a likelihood of confusion.
III.

THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGIATE LICENSING

A. INTRODUCTION

The prevalence of collegiate licensing has skyrocketed in recent years. Today,
approximately three hundred colleges and universities actively license the use of
their names and registered trademarks."°° What began with a primitive licensing
arrangement at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) in the 1930s
01
has blossomed into a multi-billion dollar industry.'
Institutions typically engage in one of two primary types of licensing programs,
or in some cases, a hybrid of the two. Some schools opt for an independent
licensing program. Under that arrangement, the licensing function is entirely selfcontained. It operates as an in-house activity of the institution."° The internal
licensing program at the University of Notre Dame is an excellent example of a
highly efficient independent arrangement.'
Conversely, a college or university
may establish external licensing programs, employing the services of licensing
agents. Today, two companies control the bulk of the collegiate licensing market:
The Collegiate Licensing Company and The Licensing Resource Group. The
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) was formed in 1981 and currently
represents over two hundred colleges, universities, athletic conferences, and bowl
games, as well as the National Association of Collegiate Athletics (NCAA)"1° and
the Heisman Trophy.' s The Licensing Resource Group (LRG), founded in
1991,1°6 represents over one hundred colleges and universities. 7
The primary advantage offered by an independent licensing program is
control."~ Specifically, this arrangement allows the school to manage all aspects

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (W.D. Ark. 1995); Bd. of Regents Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Buzas Baseball, Inc.,
176 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
t00 Jack Revoyr, Non-Defiidtive Histor ofColklgiateLicensin&g 88 TRADEMARK REP. 370,370 (1998).
'01 Id at 371.
'o

Seegeneral# Lattinvilie, supra note 1, at 87.

103 Id
1"4

David A. Markiewicz, Full-Court Pes: Authorities Take Action to Stop Sale of Bogus Appal,

ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 28, 2002, at El.
10s At http://www.clc.com/Pages/home2.htm
(last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
106 At http://www.lrgusa.com/about.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
107 At http://www.Irgusa.com/clients/index.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
10' Lattinville, supra note 1, at 87.
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of the licensing program, including the registration process, licensee selection,
artwork approval, and product quality control."° Another consideration is cost.
Licensing agents may charge upwards of forty to fifty percent of royalty
revenues,"' although a fee of approximately twenty percent is probably more
realistic."' Additionally, the use of an independent licensing program offers the
institution greater discretion in handling disputes with unregistered users. For
example, a minor trademark infringement by a good-faith retailer may not result
in litigation if the school operates an independent program."'
Again, the University of Notre Dame is the poster child of how an independent licensing program should operate."' Notre Dame has a large national
following and is independent, meaning it is not affiliated with any particular
athletic conference. These two factors contribute to the school's ability to
negotiate its own contracts." 4 Notre Dame typically ranks first or second each
year in total royalty income."
While independent programs can certainly be profitable, many colleges and
universities choose to outsource their licensing functions to licensing agents.
CLC, LRG, and other licensing agents provide valuable services such as
specialization, expertise, and better visibility." 6 From the licensee's perspective,
the major advantage flowing from the school's use of a licensing agent is that the
licensee need only sign one contract to gain the rights to the registered marks of
all the schools represented by that agent." 7 The disadvantage to the college or
university, as compared to the use of an independent program, is the loss of
control."' Licensing agents currently represent approximately seventy-five
percent of all institutions with licensing programs."'

109 Id
110

Id

11Revoyr, supranote

100, at 396.
Lattinville, supra note 1, at 87.
113See Revoyr, supra note 100, at 389 (suggesting that "Notre Dame probably has the best
organizational arrangement of any university in licensing").
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 25,2003, at
Tony Barnhart, ACC.Eyes Irisb,
114 Id at 388; see alrs, e.g.,
Fl (discussing licensing arrangements as a barrier to Notre Dame joining the Atlantic Coast
Conference).
115Revoyr, supra note 100, at 389.
116 Andrea Corey, Miuoun Univerio Signs ProductDealwith Atlanta-BasedLicensing Firm,CoLUM.
112

DAILY TRB. (Missouri), Apr. 20, 1999, availabk at LEXIS, News Library, Krtbus File.
11 Revoyr, supra note 100, at 387.
18 See id at 388 (stating "Itihe most common complaint of the colleges working with the agents
is that some licensees were authorized to market products that may not have been of the best quality
or taste, and may not be acceptable to some individual institutions").
119 Lattinville, supra note 1, at 87.
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Licensing agents provide other advantages as well, including greater consistency in administering licensing programs, emphasis on better service, expansion
of licensing to a broader array of products, marketing support, and
enforcement.120
B. ENFORCEMENT OF LICENSING RIGHTS BY LICENSING AGENTS

One of the most important advantages gained from employing a licensing
agent is superior enforcement of licensing rights. Agents form alliances in order
to police the market and thwart the efforts of counterfeiters."' Because of the
nature of the question posed in the introduction of this Note,I" enforcement is

a crucial issue when determining both the rights of colleges and universities and
the rights of individuals who seek to turn a quick profit through the sale of
novelty items bearing an institution's mark.
The size of the collegiate licensing market, over $2 billion annually, 23 makes
counterfeiting both easy and profitable. It should be noted that, in this context,
the term "counterfeiting" does not refer to merchandise that is "fake" but rather
to merchandise that is not licensed by the trademark owner. In a market of this
size, counterfeiters can produce items at a lower cost and sell them on the
street." The problem is not only that colleges and universities do not approve
of the unlicensed use of their registered marks but also that each sale of an
unlicensed item represents lost income. 2 1 This loss of revenue affects the
institution involved as well as the ultimate consumer. 26 The costs associated with
a licensing program increase the price of merchandise.12 7 Moreover, the fact that
Id at 396; see alo Corey, supra note 116.
Revoyr, supranote 100, at 396. Revoyr notes, however, that independent institutions were the
leaders in initiating policing and enforcement programs. Id
122Are the t-shirts sold on campus on game day licensed by the institution, and does it matter?
120

121

122

Markiewicz, supra note 104, at El.

124

id

Blake Dickinson, Nettled by the 'Net: School Fight Unl ensed Use of Trademark.r, HERALD-SUN
(Durham, NC), Nov. 3,1996, at G3; see also Cooper, supranote 5 (stating that the University ofTexas
does not receive any compensation from unlicensed vendors).
12 For instance, it has been noted that for
every one counterfeit T-shirt that sells, four parties are affected ... the retailer,
who plays by the rules and misses out on the money; the college or university,
who misses the royalties of the otherwise-sold official product; the manufacturer,
who does not receive money for the originals that are produced under licensed
contract; and the consumers, who don't get their money's worth because it is a
knockoff product.
Eryn Curfman,AsNCAA Teams Battle, FirmFightsMerchandiseKnockoffs; CompanyScours Events to Keep
Bootlqer Away, IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), Mar. 16, 2001, at Business, 1.
12 Cooper, supra note 5.
125
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counterfeiters are able to undercut the prices charged by "legitimate" retailers
might compel institutions to charge a higher licensing fee, as colleges and
universities seek to recoup revenues lost on the sale of unlicensed goods.
Additionally, counterfeiters are likely to be more prevalent at schools with
highly successful athletic programs and near the sites of important athletic
events."' Indeed, institutions with top-notch athletic programs can realize as
much as $1 million annually in royalty revenue or even as much as $3 million if
a team wins a national championship."2 Thus, the potential loss of hundreds of
thousands of dollars in revenue prompts institutions to take the issue of
enforcement seriously.
How exactly do colleges and universities go about enforcing their trademark
rights against counterfeiters? With regard to large-scale infringers (as in the cases
discussed in Part II), enforcement may involve sending the offending party a
"cease and desist" letter followed by a lawsuit if corrective action is not taken.
The task becomes more challenging, however when the offending party is a
small-time counterfeiter making the rounds on a college campus. Often, it may
be difficult to identify the parties involved beyond the individuals actually selling
the goods. These situations present an opportunity for institutions to capitalize
on their use of a licensing agent.
One of a licensing agent's primary responsibilities is to protect its client's
trademarks against infringement. "o To this end, licensing agents regularly patrol
1 31
campuses on game days in an attempt to confiscate counterfeit merchandise.
For example, CLC sends enforcement representatives to most major games each
weekend during football season."
These agents scrutinize any unlicensed
merchandise bearing the school's name or symbol. 33 Usually, an arrest or the
14
threat of a lawsuit is sufficient to "make the phony paraphernalia disappear."

128Ruth Ingram, Anti-Coenteirfit Unit to be in Standr, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, MS), Sept. 7,

2002, at 1B (stating that if a team "is having a lot of on-field success, there's the tendency to have
the counterfeiters come out. They go after the high-profile people."); see
also
David Hendricks, Fake
Lagos Hurt Colkges,SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEws, Mar. 20,1997, at 1E ('Unlicensed college sports
souvenirs and merchandise are probably a larger problem in cities where big-time college sports
events are more common... !1
129 Markiewicz, spra note 104, at El.
130 Id

See Dickinson, spra note 125, at G3 ("Licensing companies, college officials and police
regularly set up sting operations outside big athletic events and check on merchandise sold in T-shirt
131

shops.").
132

Ingram, supra note 128, at lB.

133

id

134

Dickinson, spra note 125, at G3.
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These enforcement measures35 result in the confiscations of thousands of pieces
of counterfeit merchandise.'
Another concern is that, while consumers may pay a lower price for
counterfeit merchandise, the old adage "you get what you pay for" still applies.
Most counterfeit merchandise is apparel, and counterfeit items are more likely to
be of lower quality. 136 Presumably, licensed merchandise is of higher quality
because schools do not usually authorize theuse of their name or mark on
inferior goods.'37 Several clues indicate that an item is licensed and therefore of
acceptable quality. Perhaps most important is the presence of an "Officially
Licensed Collegiate Product" (OLCP) label or hologram." Additionally, labels
or tags with the OLCP insignia are clear indicators that the product is genuine.
The apparel tag should be intact, as ripped neck labels denote imperfect or
irregular items. 39 Further, colleges and universities do not approve of the use of
their marks in a distasteful manner, so the use of a mark in poor taste may be
indicative of a counterfeit item. 14° Finally, the item should bear the name of the
manufacturer
and should have the appropriate trademark designation (e.g.,
141
"TM'".

Though these factors are not exhaustive, they should certainly alert

wary consumers to unlicensed merchandise.
IV. A HOUSE DIVIDED
This Note has thus far explored the background of trademark protection. It
has discussed the statutory background of trademark protection under the
Lanham Act and has examined several cases establishing the fundamental
principles of collegiate mark protection as well as the collegiate licensing industry.
This Note has further examined the different types of licensing programs that
colleges and universities use, and it has discussed the functions of licensing agents,
agent enforcement, and the characteristics of so-called "counterfeit" merchandise.
How, then, do the rules of trademark protection apply in reality? It is easy to
answer the first question presented at the outset of this Note: how does one

"' Markiewicz, supra note 104, at El (noting that CLC enforcement agents confiscated 5,000
counterfeit items at the 2002 Rose Bowl, 600 counterfeit items at the 2001 NCAA Final four, and
300 items from eight individuals at the 2000 Final Four).
136 Id.
137See Ingrain, supra note 128, at 1B (stating that officially licensed merchandise should bear an

untom tag and that the presence of a "torn or missing tag is evidence of a second-hand garment, one
that probably would not meet the quality standards in place at the universities").
Curfman, supranote 126, at Business, 1.
0 Ingram, smpira note 128, at lB.
141 Id
"s
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determine whether a particular item bearing a college or university mark is
licensed? Now it is time to turn to the second question: does it matter whether
such an item is officially licensed by the institution whose trademark it bears?
Based on the Lanham Act provisions and the enforcement policies of licensing
agents, it seems that any entity producing collegiate products without the
permission of the institution whose marks they employ must be violating the law.
The answer to the question really turns on one issue: likelihood of confusion.
This issue has already been discussed for explanatory purposes, but now it is time
to look at how courts actually apply this crucial element.
Cases involving claims of trademark infringement can be divided into two
"families" based on the reasoningof the courts deciding them. On the one hand,
there are cases in which courts have held that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
mark created sufficient likelihood of confusion to warrant a finding that the
defendant had violated the plaintiff's trademark rights. At the other end of the
spectrum are cases in which the courts have held that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's trademark created no likelihood of confusion. Ironically, the cases
falling into these two categories share many factual similarities. By examining
these two lines of cases, we can better understand what courts mean when they
use the term "likelihood of confusion" and, more importantly, how they apply it.
An analysis of the decisions suggests that, in most cases in which one would
expect the "counterfeiter" to have created sufficient likelihood of confusion, that
element is, in reality, lacking. Further exploration of "likelihood of confusion"
demonstrates that, in many instances, the sale of unlicensed goods bearing a
college's or university's registered trademark is a completely legal activity, and the
college or university has no remedy against such use.
A. THE "BOSTON HOCKEY" FAMILY OF CASES

Three sports licensing cases demonstrate the courts' analysis in finding that a
defendant's use of a registered trademark has caused sufficient likelihood of
confusion. This Note shall refer to this line of cases as the "Boston Hockey"
cases, a name derived from the earliest of the three cases, Boston ProfessionalHockVy

Association, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.'42 The related cases in
this family are NationalFootball-agueProperties,Inc. v. Wichita FallsSportswear,Inc.143
and University of GeoriaAthleticAssociation v. Laite,'" both of which this Note has
already discussed to some degree. These cases explore the issue of likelihood of
confusion as it relates to source of origin. In this regard, the courts in these cases

142
"'
14

510 F.2d 1004, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364 (5th Cir. 1975).
532 F. Supp. 651, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122 (11th Cir. 1985).
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based their holdings on a finding that consumers could have mistakenly believed
that the items in question were somehow sponsored, endorsed, or otherwise
connected with the respective plaintiffs.
In Boston Hockey, the hockey league and its member teams sued to enjoin the
defendant from producing unlicensed embroidered emblems bearing the teams'
registered trademarks. Specifically, the defendant embroidered the plaintiffs'
trademarks on patches to be sold for attachment to articles of clothing.143 While
the plaintiffs sought relief on the grounds of trademark infringement and unfair
competition, the court stated that the same facts that support an action for
trademark infringement would also be sufficient to satisfy the elements of unfair
competition. In so holding, the court stated that the "whole basis of the law of
'unfair competition'... is that no one shall sell his goods in such a way as to make
it appear that they come from some other source."'" The court further noted
that confusion as to the source of origin of a product is present when "the alleged
unregistered trademarks used by the plaintiff are so associated with its goods that
the use of the same or similar marks by another company constitutes a representation that its goods come from the same source." 47
The Boston Hockey court essentially employed a market analysis in determining
that there was likelihood of confusion; specifically, the court concluded that
without the plaintiff's marks, the defendant would not have a market for its
product." Down below, the district court had found no likelihood of confusion
since the typical purchaser was not likely to believe the emblems were manufactured by, or in some way connected to, the plaintiffs. 49 The Fifth Circuit rejected
this argument that the confusion must be as to the source of the manufactare,
declaring instead that the likelihood of confusion element is satisfied when the
consumer knows that the plaintiff is the source of the trademark."s In so holding,
the court implied that consumers will infer that an item bearing an entity's logo
was in fact authorized by that entity.
The court also rejected the defendant's functionality defense on the ground
that the items were purchased, not because of any aesthetic characteristic apart
from the trademark itself, but because the trademark was the precise item being
sold. t ' Functional items are not always entitled to the same protections as nonfunctional items, and in Boston Hocky, the distinguishing point was that the
defendants sold patches which consisted entirly of the plaintiffs' trademark. In

145
14

Geier, supra note 24, at 674.
Boston Hocky, 510 F.2d at 1010.

147 J4

m Id at 1011.
d at 1012.

149

Ill

Idoto
Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013.
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other words, a patch is quite different from, for example, a t-shirt or cap bearing
a college or university mark. As indicated by the court, the former has little
consumer demand without the trademark as there would be no product aside
from a blank patch. 2 The latter, however, has consumer demand, even without
the unlicensed mark.
Boston Hockey, therefore, stands for two principles. First, the consumer need
not be confused as to whether the trademark owner sponsored the item bearing
its mark; rather, the consumer need only believe that the trademark appearing on
the item is the trademark of the entity with whom the consumer associates the
product, regardless of who owns it. This proposition employs circuitous
reasoning, and later decisions discussed below reject it. Clearly, the consumer
believes the trademark depicted is the trademark of the entity with whom the
consumer associates the item; that is precisely why the consumer purchases the
item. For example, if a consumer wants to express her loyalty to Duke University,
she seeks a t-shirt depicting a blue and white Duke Blue Devil, not just any devil,
regardless of whether Duke owns the trademark. Regardless of whether the item
is licensed, the consumer is unlikely to believe that the team owning the trademark
actually produced the item and is also unlikely to believe that the company that
actually did produce the item owns the trademark. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning
therefore seems paternalistic.
Second, the issue of confusion as to sponsorship aside, the court noted that
the difficulty in the case arose from the fact that the item sold is a tangible form
of the registered mark and nothing else. This leaves open the question of whether
the court would reject the functionality defense if the defendant had sold not only
the patches bearing the plaintiffs' trademark but also the article of clothing to
which it was attached, such as a jacket or cap.

In National FootballLeague Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., NFL
Properties, the league's licensing agent, and the Seattle Seahawks, a member team,
sought to enjoin the defendant from producing replica jerseys. 3 The court stated
that the "ultimate test" for infringement or unfair competition is whether the
consumer is likely to be deceived by the similarity of the marks." s Just as the
court in Boston Hockgy inferred that consumers will assume that an item bearing
an entity's logo was authorized by the trademark owner, the Wichita Fall court
held that likelihood of confusion in a sponsorship context depends on whether
the public believes that a product bearing a team's mark originated with or was
s
endorsed or sponsored by the team.'

152
153

Seid at 1011.
532 F. Supp. 651, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
at 657.

154 Id

s 1d at 659.
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The plaintiffs conducted a consumer survey showing that upon seeing a replica
jersey, a large number of respondents believed that the company producing the
jersey needed permission to make it1s6 The court found this evidence persuasive

in holding that the products had secondary meaning and that the defendant had
created actual confusion."5s It is troubling that the court based its finding of
actual confusion, which the court deemed a factor in determining likelihood of
confusion, on the survey detailing the respondents' belief that the producer of the
item needed permission to manufacture the item. The court's reasoning implies
that authorization is required because the consumer believes that to be the case.
The survey produced no evidence, however, that the consumer would be deceived
because she thought the item was produced with permission.
If an unlicensed seller could somehow eliminate consumers' belief that the
seller's product was manufactured with permission, would that also dispel any
notion of confusion as to the sponsor? Would a disclaimer serve this function?
In this case, the court modified an earlier injunction to require the defendant to
place a disclaimer on the label of each jersey reading "Not authorized or
sponsored by the NFL." '
The court noted that these disclaimers were in
inconspicuous locations or employed modified phrasing.'5 The court thus left
open the question as to whether a properly and conspicuously placed disclaimer
would have sufficed to alleviate any consumer confusion.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the jerseys were
functional. Although the court stated that if a feature is an "important ingredient
in the commercial success of the product," imitation is permitted,"6 the court
dismissed the defendant's claim that the replica was unmarketable without the
team's descriptive term on the ground that an attractive feature is not "per se
functional." 16 ' The court contradicted the reasoning in Boston Hockey that
functional items are marketable because of aesthetic characteristics apart from the
trademark. 62 Here, the jerseys certainly had desirable aesthetic qualities apart
from the team's trademark.
Wichita Falls infers that simply because consumers believe a product bearing
a team's trademark is authorized, the consumer will somehow be "tricked" based
on that assumption. Further, the court gave no weight to the notion that a jersey
has functional appeal apart from the presence of the plaintiffs' mark. Finally, the
15 Id at 658.

1s-I4 at 659-61.
"s Wichita Falls,532 F. Supp. at 661.
159

Id
'60 Id at 662.
161 Id

" See Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004,
1013, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 370 (5th Cii. 1975).
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court left open the possibility that an appropriately conspicuous disclaimer would
eliminate any likelihood of confusion.
In the final demonstrative case in the "Boston Hockey" family, University of
GeorgiaAthkticAssociationv. Laite,'63 the University of Georgia sued the defendant
to enjoin the sale of the defendant's novelty beer. Specifically, the defendant
marketed 'Battlin' Bulldog Beer" in red and black cans which portrayed an
English bulldog wearing a red sweater with a black "G" and a football tucked
under its arm, very similar to one of the University's registered marks."M The
court agreed with the district court that the defendant's product created a
likelihood of confusion because of the similarity
between the plaintiff's and
165
defendant's marks and the defendant's intent.
More important than the court's reasons for finding likelihood of confusion,
however, were the defendant's arguments which the court rejected. Specifically,
the defendant argued that any confusion regarding the beer related not to its
origin but to whether it had been licensed by the school, and the defendant
claimed that no consumer would actually think the school had entered the
brewing business.'6 Citing Boston Hockey, the court maintained that confusion
need not relate to the origin of the product, but rather, to the origin of the
67
trademark.1
The defendant also claimed that his product could not truly cause consumer
confusion since the cans contained a disclaimer stating "Not associated with the
University of Georgia."'"
The court rejected this argument because the
disclaimers were inconspicuous and, again citing Boston Hockfy, a disclaimer of this
69
nature is insufficient when the case involves exact duplication.1
Thus, University of Georgia raises two of the criticisms previously discussed.
First, as in Boston Hockg, and in fact relying on Boston Hockg, the court stated that
a consumer need not believe that the university actually brewed the beer but only
that the university owned the trademark appearing on the product. The court
rejected the notion that, in order to be confused, a consumer must believe that
the school had gone into the brewing business. This notion is subject to criticism,
at least with respect to the idea that the only way a consumer could possibly be

163
164

756 F.2d 1535, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id at 1537.

165 Id at 1543-45 (noting that the slight "differences between the two [marks were] so minor as
to be legally, if not factually nonexistent" and that the defendant "candidly admitted... that 'Battlin'

Bulldog Beer' was intended to capitalize on the popularity of the University of Georgia football
program").
166 Id at 1546.
167 Id (citing Boston Hocky, 510 F.2d at 1012).
168 Unix.of Ga, 756 F.2d at 1547.
169 Id (citing Boston Hockq,, 510 F.2d at 1013).
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confused is if she believed that the school was in the business of brewing beer.
Moreover, no reasonable consumer could reach such a conclusion. Even though
schools do, in some instances, provide products and services aside from
educational services, most of those products and services are education-related.
While it is possible to argue that beer brewing could be related to education, that
connection is, at best, remote. In reality, there is little likelihood that a consumer
would be confused in this manner.
Second, with respect to the notion that the university sponsored, endorsed,
authorized, or was otherwise associated with the sale of beer, an appropriate
disclaimer should be enough to eliminate any confusion. In this case, the court
noted the inconspicuous nature of the disclaimer. 7 ' Unlike the decision in Wichita
Falls,which left open the question of whether a disclaimer would be sufficient if
properly displayed, the University of Georgia court stated that no disclaimer may
remedy illegal confusion when there is exact duplication of the owner's mark."'
The court's ruling on disclaimers is counterintuitive. Granted, if a product
uses a certain trademark, it is conceivable that a consumer might be confused as
to the source of the product (unless that conclusion is absurd, as in the case of a
university entering the brewing business). If, however, a disclaimer is conspicuous and contains language clearly indicating that the trademark owner has not
authorized the product, why is that measure incapable of dispelling confusion,
even if there is exact duplication of the mark? In considering disclaimers, what
difference should the degree of similarity between marks make? A disclaimer is
a disclaimer. Regardless of the similarity between the marks, any disclaimer clearly
stating that the trademark owner has not authorized, endorsed, or sponsored the
product should eliminate confusion on the part of a reasonable consumer.
A court is nearly certain to find that trademark infringement has occurred if,
as in the "Boston Hockey" family of cases, it requires only that the consumer
make the logical assumption that the mark originates in the trademark owner
without requiring that the consumer truly believe that the trademark owner was
responsible for the product's manufacture. These cases have left open the
question of whether a disclaimer is sufficient to eliminate consumer confusion,
except in the case of exact duplication. Finally, these courts are reluctant to look
favorably on a defense of functionality when the product prominently features
another's registered mark. These cases might be aptly classified not as protective
of the trademark owner but rather, as protective of the consumer. The "Boston
Hockey" cases assume that consumers are relatively naive and are unable to
exercise even a marginal amount of common sense. In reality, reasonable

1I0 Id at 1547 (noting that the disclaimers were "practically invisible when the cans are grouped
together into six-packs").
171 Id
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consumers are not likely to be deceived into thinking that an entity has produced
an item wholly unrelated to its normal course of business. Further, reasonable
consumers are not likely to believe that an entity has endorsed an item when a
disclaimer clearly instructs them to the contrary.
B. THE "JOB'S DAUGHTERS" FAMILY OF CASES

In contrast to the "Boston Hockey" cases, the 'Job's Daughters" cases
provide a basis for finding that there is no likelihood of confusion in many
situations involving unlicensed collegiate merchandise. In addition to the
foundational case, InternationalOrder ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 72 this
family of cases is comprised of Bi-Rite Enteprises,Inc. v. Button Master,73 University
of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 74 and Board of Governors of the Universiy of
North Carolina v. Helpingstine7 s These cases have found a lack of likelihood of
confusion based on a rejection of Boston Hock!y's monopolistic and endorsement
standpoint, a finding of functionality, and the relationship between the intent of
the defendant and belief of the consumer.
In Job's Daughters, the plaintiff, a young women's organization, sued the
defendant for trademark infringement arising out of the defendant's manufacture
and sale of jewelry bearing the plaintiff's insignia. The court recognized the same
rationale underlying trademark law as the courts in the 'Boston Hockey" cases
(i.e., that trademark law is concerned with eliminating consumer confusion). The
court refused to find that the plaintiffs had shown a sufficient likelihood of
confusion, however, because the court deemed the items to be functional and did
not believe that consumers would infer that the plaintiff's trademark served as a
designation of origin.
The Job'~Daughterscourt expressly rejected the reasoning of Boston Hock!y76 on
two grounds. First, the court noted that "[i]nterpreted expansively, Boston
Hockey holds that a trademark's owner has a complete monopoly over its use,
'
including its functional use."177
The court found no legislative intent to grant
trademark owners such broad property rights.'78 Instead, the court read the
Lanham Act only as protecting consumers from confusion and entitling

172
173

633 F.2d 912,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (9th Cir. 1980).
555 F. Supp. 1188, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

175

566 F. Supp. 711, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 834 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
714 F. Supp. 167, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (M.D.N.C. 1989).

176

633 F.2d at 918.

177

id

174

178 md
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trademark owners to a means by which to differentiate their products from those
of other entities."'
Second, the court found no confusion as to the source of origin because the
defendant had never indicated that its merchandise was "official."'' The Boston
Hock , court opined that a consumer need not be confused as to the source of the
manufacture of the products but only need recognize that a trademark owner
owns the trademark appearing on the item in question. In contrast, the Job'
Daughters court noted that it would be "naive to conclude that the name or
emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product somehow
originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem

signifies..... Further, the court maintained that the defendant could capitalize on
a market fad created by another so long as he did not deceive the public so that
they purchased
the product with the mistaken belief that it was the product of the
2
18

plaintiff.

Thus, the case is distinguishable from Boston Hockgy. TheJob's Daugbters court
took the position that consumers do not necessarily purchase a product because
they believe that it originated with the trademark owner. As long as the consumer
does not believe that the trademark owner is the source of the product, the
defendant is permitted to capitalize on the market fad that the trademark owner
has created, even if the defendant has used the plaintiff's mark. In contrast to the
"Boston Hockey" line of cases, the Job's Daughters court placed more faith in the
consumer. Whereas the "Boston Hockey" courts assumed that consumers desire
products because they are associated with the trademark owner, the Job's Daugbters
court asserted that consumers do not necessarily purchase an item simply because
of a perceived connection between the item and the mark owner.
Furthermore, the Job's Daughterscourt indicated a greater willingness than the
"Boston Hockey" courts to recognize the functionality of the products. The
court noted that the functional features of a product are those that comprise the
actual benefit the consumer seeks, as distinguished from those features assuring
8 3 Moreover, the court
consumers that a particular entity endorsed the product."
stated that an interest in free competition permits the imitation of functional
features unless those features are copyrighted or patented,' but the court did not
extend this standard to trademarks.

Geier, supra note 24, at 678.
180Id
""

"1 633 F.2d at 918.
"82

Id at 919.

'8-

Id at 917.

194 Id
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In this case, the court found that the plaintiff's marks were aesthetic
characteristics of the jewelry and did not serve as a designation of origin.8 5 The
jewelry in question featured the Order's insignia, yet the court found the insignia
to be a functional and aesthetic characteristic of the item. How is this any
different from a t-shirt, cap, or sweater bearing a university's name or athletic
trademark? One might argue that apparel is even more functional than jewelry,
and if jewelry portraying another entity's trademark does not deceive consumers
as to the source of origin, then neither does an item of apparel. This is especially
true when the seller of an allegedly infringing product does not denote the
product as being official, a factor the court found persuasive.
In Bi-Rite Enterprisesv. ButtonMaster,"6 the plaintiffs, various performing artists
and their exclusive licensee, sued the defendants for the unlicensed sale of novelty
items bearing the likenesses of the performers. Defendants sold their novelty
items outside concerts and in retail outlets." 7 In holding that the defendant had
not engaged in trademark infringement, the court focused on the issues of
monopoly, free competition, and functionality.'8
The court first noted that while copyright and patent laws grant the creators
of original expression and ideas a monopoly over their use, the law of trademarks
does not share a similar purpose;8 9 the Job's Daughterscourt also expressed this
notion. 90 Instead, trademark laws serve "to protect the individual reputation and
good-will that parties build for their goods in the market."'' The court reasoned
that trademark law does not grant a monopoly to the trademark owner but instead
encourages competition. 92
Employing an economic analysis based on a model of competition, the Bi-Rite
court noted that copying prevents monopoly. 93 Through copying, the prices of
goods are reduced, and the items become more widely accessible.' 94 As in Job's
Daughters, the court agreed that capitalizing on a fad or market created by another
is permissible as long as it is not accomplished by deceiving the public that the
item is the product of the competitor. 95 Thus, the court used an economic
Id at 918.
555 F. Supp. 1188, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
87 Id at 1191.
8a Id at 1194-95. However, the court did grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the
ground that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' right to publicity. Id at 1201.
'89 Id at 1194.
185
18

190See 633 F.2d at 918-19.

'91
Bi-Rite, 555 F. Supp. at 1194.
192 Id at 1194-95.
193 Id

at 1195.

1% Id
' See id (citing Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., Ltd., 609 F.2d 655, 204 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 609 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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analysis to justify copying so long as the consumer is not confused as to the
source of origin of the product. It therefore stands to reason that as long as the
purchaser of an unlicensed item bearing the mark of a college or university does
not mistakenly believe that the institution is the source of the product, then
production of the item is permissible under the Bi-Rite analysis.
The court also entertained the defendants' functionality argument, noting that
"buttons tend primarily to be a medium for communicating ideas or positions;
'
The
they are not commodities sold to serve any other functional purpose."196
7
To the court,
buttons, therefore, failed to serve as indicators of origin."
functionality meant that consumers desired the defendants' products for their
intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin. 9 This concept might be better
termed "communicative functionality." When items are used to communicate
ideas, they are functional and do not receive protection under unfair competition
laws."' As the Job's Daughters court aptly noted:
We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing
allegiances. Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned with
inscriptions showing the organizations we belong to, the schools we
attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports teams we support, the
beverages we imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently
include names and emblems that are also used as collective marks
or trademarks, it would be naive to conclude that the name or
emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product
somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the
2
name or emblem signifies. 00
This logic, as discussed in considering Job's Daughters and emphasized here,
provides the single best rationale for finding that the college or university's mark
constitutes a communicative and functional feature on a piece of apparel or
novelty item and that such use of a mark does not qualify as an example of
trademark infringement. There is no likelihood of confusion because the
consumer desires the item for its communicative functionality and not because
it indicates a source of origin.

Bi-Rite, 555 F. Supp. at 1195.
197 Geier, supra note 24, at 676.
198 Bi-Rite, 555 F. Supp. at 1195.
196

199 Id.

o Int'l Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,918, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
718, 724 (9th Cir.1980) (emphasis added).
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Communicative functionality was also an issue in Universiy of Pittsburgh v.
Champion Products, Inc. 20 1 This case has already been discussed extensively in
examining the fundamentals of trademark law; thus, examination here will focus
on the court's rationale in finding no likelihood of confusion. In bringing suit
against Champion, Pitt sought to enjoin the defendant from marketing soft goods
bearing the school's insignia. The court found, however, that such use was
functional, allowing the wearer to express "identity, affiliation, or allegiance to
Pitt."2 2 Deeming the insignia to be an essential feature of the product, the court
concluded that the product could not perform its function without the college's
trademark. 3
As discussed, courts often look for evidence of actual confusion when
determining whether a defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark is likely to cause
confusion. In Wichita, the court seemed satisfied with the plaintiff's survey
indicating that a substantial portion of respondents believed that the NFL
authorized production of the replica jerseys.' In University ofPittsburgh,the court
noted, however, that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence of actual
confusion where a consumer had purchased soft goods in the mistaken belief that
Pitt had endorsed the product.20 s Courts seem to favor survey evidence, though
it is certainly questionable as to whether permission to use a trademark is required
simply because the consumer thinks it must be. In any event, the court2 6found
that Pitt had not provided any evidence indicating consumer confusion. 0
Of course, consumers are even less likely to assume that an entity has
sponsored or endorsed a product when that product's label or packaging clearly
indicates the opposite. If Wichita and University of Georgialeft open the question
of whether disclaimers can sufficiently eliminate consumer confusion as to the
source of the goods, the court in Universiy ofPittsburgh seems to have answered it.
The court noted that Champion's labels and packaging clearly identified
Champion as the source of the goods, that Champion's label was conspicuously
placed, and that Champion had made reasonable efforts to indicate the true
source of origin.2 7 Further, the court found no evidence that Champion had ever
indicated that its merchandise was "official. ' , 2' At last, a court was willing to
recognize that reasonable measures on the part of the defendant to indicate that

20 566 F. Supp. 711, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 834 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
202 Id at 716.
203 Id

2 Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 658,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175, 179-80 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
205 566 F. Supp. at 713.
Id at 714.
207 Id at 714-15.

=oId at 717.
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it was not the source of origin of the trademark were sufficient to dispel any
likelihood of confusion.
The court also rejected the paternalistic attitude toward consumers embodied
in the "Boston Hockey" cases, recognizing instead that no evidence indicated that
consumers attached any significance to the question of whether Pitt had actually
sponsored or endorsed the soft goods.2" 9 Additionally, there was "no evidence
that the consumer cares who has made the soft goods or whether they were made
under license."21 If the consumer does not care about the source of origin, then
there can be no confusion.
Lastly, the court found that Pitt had failed to prove secondary meaning with
respect to the soft goods. The university, primarily in the business of providing
educational services, had made no showing that the Pitt insignia had taken on a
secondary meaning in the soft goods market prior to Champion's entry into that
market and had failed to demonstrate a substantial association in the public's
mind between the defendant's use of the Pitt insignia and the notion that the
2
school was somehow affiliated with the source of the goods. ' That finding
for any university to overcome the descriptive"implies that it might be difficult
2 12
hurdle."
meaning
secondary
Although the ensuing settlement vacated the Universio7 of Pittsburghdecision, it
still stands for several important principles. First, the court recognized the
concept of communicative functionality. Unlicensed apparel or novelty items
bearing a college or university's mark which communicates the purchaser's
support of that school satisfies the requirements for a defense of functionality.
Second, the court answered the question left open in Wichita and Universi!y of
Georgiaas to whether an appropriate and conspicuous disclaimer could sufficiently
eliminate likelihood of confusion. If a product is not advertised as "official," and
if the item's label or packaging clearly indicates the item's true source of origin,
then the risk of confusion is greatly reduced. Finally, University ofPittsburghstands
for the proposition that if consumers do not care whether an academic institution
sponsors or endorses a particular product, then the issue of likelihood of
confusion is moot.
The final case in the 'Job's Daughters" lineage, Board of Governors of the
Universi y of North Carolina v.Hingstine,'" examines the issue of likelihood of
confusion from a different perspective. In that case, like the others, the plaintiff
sued the defendant to enjoin the unlicensed use of its registered trademark.

209Id at

716.

210

Univ. of Pittsburgh,566 F. Supp. at 721.

211

Id

xupra note 24, at 671.
714 F. Supp. 167, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (M.D.N.C. 1989).

212 Geier,
21
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Though both parties' motions for summary judgment on the issue of trademark
infringement were denied,1 4 the court offered some important insights regarding
likelihood of confusion. Specifically, the court focused on the noncompetitive
nature of the goods at issue and the fact that the defendant had used an exact
duplication of the plaintiff's mark.21
The court did not flatly reject the reasoning of Boston Hockey but instead noted
that Boston Hockgwas "at one extreme" on the issue of likelihood of confusion.216
The court recognized that, in some instances, the alleged infringer's use of the
plaintiff's mark with the knowledge that the public is aware of the mark's origin
satisfies the test for likelihood of confusion, while in other situations, likelihood
of confusion occurs only when the consumer is confused about the origin of the
goods themselves.2 7 To the University of North Carolinacourt, however, a "middle
ground" was preferable, wherein likelihood of confusion exists where there is
confusion as to the "source, sponsorship, or endorsement of the goods."2" 8 Thus,
the court began its discussion of the issue by hinting that it was not willing to find
that confusion existed simply because the consumer was aware that the seller of
the unlicensed items did not own the trademark. The court thus aligned itself
with Job 'Daughter?'9 while distancing itself from Boston Hockey.
The court held that the case involved "non-competitive" goods; in other
words, "the supposed infringer put[s] a mark on an item which is too remote
from any itemthat the owner would be likely to make or sell."' In that situation,
according to the court, the use of an exact replica of a registered mark is
insufficient to establish likelihood of confusion. In denying the University's
motion for summary judgment, the court held that it was a question of fact as to
whether consumers view the use of such marks as an indicator of sponsorship." 2
The "Boston Hockey" cases rejected the argument that confusion was less likely
when the item in question is not one the trademark owner would be expected to
produce.' The University of North Carolinacourt's recognition of "non-competitive" goods, however, embraces this concept. Though this argument is not

217

Id at 177.
Id at 172-73.
Id at 172.
Id

21,

Univ. of N. Carolina,714 F. Supp. at 172.

214
215
216

219Id
220 Id
221 Id

' For example, the court in University ofGeoriadismissed the defendant's argument that no one
would truly believe that a college had gone into the brewing business. Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass'n
v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1130 (11th Cir. 1985).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

31

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 8

J. INTELL PROP. L

[Vol. 11:421

conclusive in all cases, it is nevertheless significant that a court has actually made
a point to recognize it.
The fact that the plaintiff has a valid mark "does not mean that another's use
of a similar or even the same mark will always meet the likelihood of confusion test
necessary to establish infringement." 3 Rather, the court found that "similarity
or even identity of marks is not sufficient to establish confusion where noncompetitive goods are involved" and rejected the position that "intent to
capitalize on popularity is sufficient to establish infringement." 24 In Universi-y of
Georgia, the court found that Laite's intent to capitalize on the popularity of the
school's football program, coupled with the similarity of the marks, was sufficient
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.22 The court in University ofNorth
Carolina dismissed that reasoning, noting the University of Georia court's heavy
reliance on Boston Hockg and the fact that the "broad language of Boston Hockey
has been narrowed in subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions."226
Finally, the court, like the others in the "Job's Daughters" family, recognized
the concept of communicative functionality. The court was "skeptical that those
individuals who purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing UNC-CH's marks care one
way or the other whether the University sponsors or endorses such products or
whether the products are officially licensed. '' 1 7 Instead, the court found it equally
likely that consumers bought the products to profess their support for the
institution.' The court seemed to side with the Universily of Pittsburgh court in
finding that if the consumer does not care whether the college or university
sponsored the product, then likelihood of confusion is significantly diminished.
This case stands opposed to the "Boston Hockey" cases and supports the
notion that likelihood of confusion is more difficult to establish when the
registered owner's mark is on a product not normally associated with the owner's
normal business activities. Further, the court rejected the idea that the use of an
exact replica of a registered mark or intent to capitalize on another's popularity
is sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion.
When considered in the aggregate, the "Job's Daughters" family of cases
stands in stark contrast to the "Boston Hockey" cases. While the latter courts
were quite willing to find that trademark infringement had occurred, the former
courts were far more reluctant to so find. Primarily, the "Job's Daughters" cases
Univ. of N. Camroia,714 F. Supp. at 170 (emphasis added).
173.
22 756 F.2d at 1545.
714 F. Supp. at 173 n.3 (stating that Boston Hockr had been narrowed in Supreme Assembly,
Order of Rainbow for Girls v.J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 757 (5th
22

224Id at

Cir. 1982)).
227 Id

at 173.

2n I
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refuse to concede that consumers purchase unlicensed promotional items bearing
registered trademarks because they believe that the mark owner sponsored the
goods. Instead, these opinions adopt the notion that consumers buy those items
in an attempt to express allegiance to, or support for, the entity whose mark is
used, irrespective of whether that entity actually endorsed the product or owned
the trademark. This seems the more reasonable approach to the issue of
likelihood of confusion. If consumers do not care and do not base their purchase
upon whether the goods are licensed, then there can be no confusion. Further, these
courts dismissed the idea that the Lanham Act grants to a trademark owner a
monopoly over the mark's use but instead noted that market competition is
preferable and that even the use of an identical reproduction of a registered mark
is not sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion. Although the "Boston
Hockey" and "Job's Daughters" cases are relatively contemporaneous, it appears
that, at least in the spirit of competition and expression, the 'Job's Daughters"
cases present a more reasonable approach.
V. CONCLUSION

At the outset of this Note, three questions were presented. First, how does
one know if a particular item bearing a college or university's trademark is
licensed? Part III identified a number of clues that might alert consumers to
unlicensed goods. Second, does it matter whether items bearing collegiate marks
are licensed? Part IV provided the perspectives of two different lines of cases; the
answer depends on which perspective one finds preferable. The third and final
question is whether it should matter if the use of a college or university's mark is
licensed. Part IV argued that, in at least some circumstances, the answer is "no."
Persons and entities expend time, money, and energy popularizing their
trademarks, and these expenditures deserve protection. The Lanham Act
provides for this protection, most notably in sections 1114 and 1125 of chapter
fifteen of the U.S. Code. The success of an action for unfair competition or
trademark infringement is predicated, however, on the finding of a number of
factors, the most important of which is likelihood of confusion.
Likelihood of confusion can be a difficult concept to comprehend, especially
when courts seem to disagree on exactly what the term means and how it applies.
As shown here, the courts deciding the "Boston Hockey" cases had a different
interpretation of likelihood of confusion than did those courts involved in the
"Job's Daughters" cases. In accordance with the latter line of cases, likelihood of
confusion seems to be present only when the consumer believes that the
trademark owner either manufactured the item bearing its mark or endorsed the
use of its mark on the item and only when the consumer would be deceived
because of this belief.
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Whether the consumer believes that the trademark originated in the entity
owning it is irrelevant; of course, the consumer believes that to be the case. That
assumption does not indicate that the consumer buys the product because of such
a belief. The reasoning of the "Job's Daughters" family of cases is therefore
preferable because those courts recognized that consumers generally do not
purchase items with the belief, mistaken or not, that the entity whose trademark
appears thereon sponsored the products. The "Job's Daughters" courts
themselves noted that consumers often do not even care whether an item is
sponsored by the entity whose trademark is used or whether the item is licensed.
Therefore, if consumers do not care whether the item is sponsored by the entity,
then there is no likelihood of confusion.
Consumers are not always indifferent to the source of origin of a particular
product, and therefore protecting the consumer's expectations is a reasonable and
worthwhile endeavor. 9 To those consumers who truly do base their decision to
purchase an item on whether the entity whose trademark is used sponsored the
product (and even to those consumers who do not care one way or the other), a
simple disclaimer indicating the true source of the goods and denying any
association with the trademark owner should sufficiently dispel any confusion
regarding the source of origin. Although the "Boston Hockey" cases rejected this
concept, the "Job's Daughters" decisions, especially University of Pitsburgh,
embrace it.
The "Job's Daughters" courts also viewed Boston Hockly and its progeny as
granting a monopoly to trademark owners over the use of their marks. In
contrast, the "Job's Daughters" courts did not interpret the Lanham Act so
broadly, instead expressing the idea that competition will make goods available to
a wider customer base because imitation tends to lower prices. Indeed, Professor
Heald notes that in "situations where consumers are not likely to be confused as
to source or sponsorship, either because they are indifferent or because of an
to identify a reason why
effective disclaimer, trademark owners are hard-pressed
'
they should be able to charge monopoly prices."
Finally, the courts deciding Job's Daughters, Bi-Rite, University ofPittsburgh, and
University of North Carolina were far more willing to recognize the defense of
functionality than their "Boston Hockey" counterparts. These courts acknowledged that consumers purchase collegiate items for their functional features and
not as an indicator of source of origin. A functional product may obtain the
necessary secondary meaning to qualify for Lanham protection ifthe consumer
purchases the good not only for its functional features but also because he

J. Heald, Fi~ng Two Gaps in the Ristatment (Thin) of Unfar Compeaitiow Mixed-Use
Tradetarksandthe Pmbkt witb Vana,47 S.C. L. REv. 783, 788 (1996).
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believes the trademark indicates an association between the product and the
mark's owner." That situation occurs, for example, when a consumer buys a
Ralph Lauren "Polo" shirt because of Ralph Lauren's reputation for quality and
status, but that is rarely the case when one purchases, for example, a University
of Georgia shirt. In most cases, consumers buy collegiate merchandise because
they want to express their support for and allegiance to a particular college or
university, not because they view the phrase "Go Dawgs!" as an indication that
the University of Georgia was the source of the product. Again, if consumers do
not care whether the school authorized the item, then there is no confusion.
The "Boston Hockey" cases present a number of questions to which the
"Job's Daughters" decisions suggest answers. No matter how persuasive one

might find the reasoning of the Job's Daughters,Bi-Rite, Univerrity of Pittrburh, and
University ofNorth Caro'nacourts, an incongruity between the two lines of cases
still exists. A grant of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court in a future
case would perhaps be the best solution to this split of authority. With at least
some sense of finality, the Court should provide answers to the questions
presented in these cases. Specifically, the Court should first determine whether
the consumer must be confused as to the sponsorship of the product or as to
whether the trademark appearing on the product is the trademark of the entity
with whom the consumer associates the item, regardless of ownership. Second,
the Court should determine whether the use of another's trademark constitutes
infringement when one displays the mark on a product having other functional
features, especially when used to communicate ideas or express allegiances. Third,
the Court should provide an answer to the question of whether permission to use
a registered trademark is required simply because consumers assume it must be.
Fourth, the Court should resolve the dispute regarding disclaimers. Is a
conspicuously and appropriately placed disclaimer sufficient to remove any
likelihood of confusion when the producer of an item has in no way indicated that
his product is "official" or otherwise sponsored by the entity whose trademark
appears thereon? Finally, the Court should determine whether an action for
trademark infringement exists when another's registered mark is used in
conjunction with "non-competitive" goods, which are so unrelated to the owner's
normal business activities that confusion is nearly impossible. By answering these
questions, the Supreme Court could make great strides in resolving the inconsistencies between the "Boston Hockey" and "Job's Daughters" cases.
Naturally, one might expect that any decision fashioned by the Supreme Court
would embrace a resolution based on the compatible reasoning of each line of

231Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 633,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 175,184 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (citing Int'l Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg
& Co., 633 F.2d 912,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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cases. The 'Job's Daughters" cases are preferable, however, because they are
more firmly rooted in reality and take a more reasonable approach in assessing
likelihood of confusion. The seller of an unlicensed product who makes no claim
that the item is "official" or who has taken reasonable steps to ensure that no
consumer could possibly purchase the item in the mistaken belief that a college
or university sponsored or endorsed the product should not be enjoined from an
otherwise legal activity. When the seller has removed all confusion from the mind
of a reasonable consumer, then he has also defeated the trademark owner's cause
of action for unfair competition or trademark infringement. Likelihood of
confusion is the sine qua non of the action, and where there is no confusion,
there likewise can be no cause of action.232
C. KNOX WITHERS

Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711,719, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
834, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
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